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1. Introduction 
While economists often anticipate countercyclical government expenditure (Alesina et al., 
2008), an established literature reports evidence of procyclical government expenditure. Expenditure 
is procyclical if it increases in economic upturns and decreases in economic downturns. There is 
evidence of procyclicality in developing countries (for example Gavin et al., 1996) and in developed 
countries (for example Woo, 2009). 
Beneficent governments might spend procyclically to maximise welfare if government 
consumption and private consumption are complements (Lane, 2003). However, the conditions 
required to rationalise procyclical expenditure as a welfare-maximising strategy are very restrictive 
and it is impossible to dismiss the relevance of political pressures for increased public expenditure. 
Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1998) argue that there are voracity effects if political 
pressures for increased public spending are more intense in economic upturns than in economic 
downturns. Lane (2003) employed Henisz’s (2000) index as an indicator of political pressures to test 
the proposition that political pressures influence the cyclicality of government expenditure.1 While the 
index was not relevant when analysing every component of government expenditure in the OECD, it 
was statistically significant when explaining procyclical consumption and procyclical wage 
expenditure.  
Lane (2003) argued that the likelihood of procyclical government expenditure depended on the 
‘distribution of fiscal power’ across different branches of government. He did not consider sub-central 
government expenditures, but suggested that “....other political claimants such as state or provincial 
governments within a federal system” (p. 2665) are relevant when explaining procyclical expenditure. 
Very few studies focus on the procyclicality of sub-central government expenditure (Abbott and Jones 
(2012), Arena and Revilla (2009) and Sturznegger and Werneck (2006) are exceptions). In this paper, 
the objective is to consider the proposition that the likelihood of procyclical sub-central government 
expenditure is influenced by the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across fiscal tiers. 
In the next section of the paper, the objective is to explore the impact of the ‘distribution of 
fiscal power’ across fiscal tiers on the cyclicality of expenditures and intergovernmental transfers 
within federations. This exploration suggests that: (i) sub-central government expenditures are likely 
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to be procyclical; (ii) discretionary transfers are likely to be procyclical and more procyclical than 
non-discretionary transfers; (iii) sub-central government expenditures are more likely to be 
procyclical if discretionary transfers are procyclical; (iv) sub-central government capital expenditures 
are more likely to be procyclical than sub-central government current expenditures; and (v) 
sub-central government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical if there is a co-incidence 
between representatives of the same political party holding office at both state and federal 
government. 
These predictions are tested with reference to the expenditures of 31 states in Mexico. The 
paper focuses on Mexico because as much as 86% of state government revenues are received as 
intergovernmental transfers from the federal government. The majority of transfers are 
non-discretionary (they are provided for specific expenditures, like education, health, crime 
prevention, etc.). While these transfers depend automatically on pre-determined formulae, one-third of 
all sub-central government revenues are received as discretionary transfers.2 Mexico is a particularly 
interesting case study because it relies more heavily on intergovernmental transfers than almost every 
other federation.3 Section 2 describes the way that the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across tiers of 
government influences the cyclicality of sub-central government expenditure. Section 3 presents the 
econometric model and the data employed to test predictions. Section 4 reports the estimation results 
and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Political pressures and procyclical expenditures 
 This section of the paper focuses on the cyclicality of intergovernmental transfers and 
sub-central government expenditures. 
 
(a) Political pressures for increased public expenditure 
 Governments are more likely to spend procyclically if political pressure to increase public 
expenditure increases as national income increases (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane, 1998). 
In empirical studies, political pressure to increase public expenditure has been identified as a 
significant determinant of procyclical expenditure (e.g. Lane, 2003; Abbott and Jones, 2013). 
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 Downs (1957) highlights politicians’ incentive to increase public expenditure to win votes and 
he also argues that politicians focus, myopically, on a four- to five-year electoral cycle. When national 
income is increasing (and tax revenues are increasing), politicians are able to accommodate pressures 
to increase spending without ever announcing a new tax (or a new tax rate). With a tendency to be 
indulgent in an economic upturn, they ‘sow the seeds’ of the difficulties they face in recessions. When 
national income and tax revenues are falling, they are not able to sustain their new commitments; in 
economic downturns they face pressures to reduce public expenditure.  
 In economic upturns the ‘flypaper effect’ increases the likelihood that politicians in sub-central 
governments will indulge pressures to increase public expenditure. If intergovernmental transfers 
increase as national income increases, pressures to increase public expenditure are more intense in 
sub-central jurisdictions because voters underestimate the tax-cost of expenditure programmes when 
they receive transfers financed by taxpayers in other jurisdictions (Oates, 1979).4 Hines and Thaler 
(1995) and Bailey and Connolly (1998) review this literature (there is a ‘flypaper effect’ because 
‘money sticks where it hits’ - in the public sector). With a ‘flypaper effect’, sub-central governments 
spend more when they receive an intergovernmental transfer than when their citizens receive an 
equivalent increase in private income.5 The implication is that the income elasticity of demand for 
sub-central government expenditures is higher the more sub-central governments receive income in 
the form of an intergovernmental transfer (Bailey and Connolly, 1998).6  
 Sub-central governments are also likely to spend procyclically because they are not able to 
borrow as easily as central governments (e.g. Sørensen, 2001).7 When Gavin et al. (1996) first 
identified procyclical expenditure, they referred to the difficulties developing countries experience 
when trying to borrow in a recession. Public spending increases if national income is increasing (and 
governments can borrow); public spending falls if income is falling (and it is difficult to borrow). In 
recessions sub-central governments face pressures to reduce public expenditure.8 
 If politicians are likely to indulge pressures to increase public expenditure in an economic 
upturn (only to find it difficult to sustain expenditure in a recession) and if this tendency is more 
marked in sub-central government jurisdictions:  
(i) The expenditures of 31 states of Mexico will be procyclical. 
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(b) Political pressures for intergovernmental transfers 
 Local politicians have electoral incentives to compete for intergovernmental transfers. With 
intergovernmental transfers, local politicians are able to increase expenditure without increasing 
taxation. Mueller (2003) argues that local politicians realise that“...the more the government spends 
holding taxes constant the happier voters are…” and “…the higher the probability of incumbent 
politicians being re-elected” (p.223). 
 Politicians at federal government level are more likely to increase intergovernmental transfers 
when national income is increasing. Local politicians are more likely to win intergovernmental 
transfers when federal government tax revenues are increasing. When national income is falling and 
when tax revenues are falling, federal governments are more constrained and are also likely to be 
more mindful that there are pressures to increase ‘direct’ federal-government expenditure on health, 
education, defence, social security, etc. These expenditures are more transparent to voters than 
intergovernmental transfers. At federal government level, politicians are mindful that they will win 
votes if they persuade voters they are able to manage the economy (e.g. Jones and Hudson, 1996). In 
an economic downturn, they are under pressure to increase ‘direct’ government expenditures and to 
signal their ability to manage aggregate demand. With the incentive to increase ‘direct’ federal 
government expenditures, they are less receptive to pressure for increased intergovernmental 
transfers. As political pressures for intergovernmental transfers are more successful in economic 
upturns than in economic downturns, intergovernmental transfers are likely to be procyclical.  
 Federal governments are responsible for managing the macro-economy (Oates, 1972) and 
politicians at federal government are mindful of the signals that their actions emit to voters. They are 
willing to accommodate pressures for increased intergovernmental transfers when national income is 
increasing. When national income is falling they must signal their willingness to increase public 
consumption expenditure, because voters are more aware of ‘direct’ expenditures than of 
intergovernmental transfers (Downs, 1960). In recessions, politicians at federal government level are 
likely to reduce discretionary intergovernmental transfers to increase public consumption. Table 1 
shows the growth rate in discretionary transfers from the federal government of Mexico to the states 
and the OECD’s estimate of the percentage output gap. Discretionary transfers and the output gap are 
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positively correlated. By contrast, government consumption is negatively correlated with the output 
gap, implying an increase in the relative importance of public consumption expenditures in a 
recession. 
< TABLE 1 NEAR HERE > 
 
 While non-discretionary transfers are largely pre-determined (by legislated formulae), the 
availability of discretionary transfers depends on the mix of incentives that politicians face over the 
economic cycle. The second prediction is that: 
 
(ii) Discretionary intergovernmental transfers are likely to be procyclical and more 
procyclical than non-discretionary transfers.  
 
 In Mexico, 31 state governments rely on discretionary intergovernmental transfers for almost 
one-third of their revenue. The third prediction is that: 
 
(iii) Sub-central government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical if discretionary 
transfers are procyclical.  
 
(c) Patterns of procyclicality across government budgets 
 When analysing political pressures for increased public spending, some groups are 
systematically more effective than others. The empirical literature suggests that producer groups are 
more effective lobbyists than consumer groups (for example Olson, 1971). In ‘small’ groups, 
individuals are more easily mobilised to exert pressure. In ‘large’ groups, individuals remain 
anonymous and apathetic. Becker (1983, 1985) argues that ‘small’ groups are more successful than 
‘large’ groups when there is competition for increased public spending. 
 While both voters and the business lobby might press to increase public consumption 
expenditure, the business lobby is more likely to press to increase public capital expenditure. Downs 
(1960) argued that voters are more aware of expenditures that exert a direct and tangible impact on 
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their day-to-day life and this is evident in voters’ responses to questionnaire surveys (see Jones, 
2006).9 Lane (2003:2665) argues that “...individual voters may care most about public consumption 
goods or transfers, business interests about infrastructure, and government employees about public 
sector wages...”. The implication is that producer groups are more likely than consumers to press for 
increases in capital expenditures.  
 If the business lobby is far more likely to monitor expected increases in national income and to 
be aware of the opportunities that exist for increased investment spending, it is also the case that 
risk-averse, vote-maximising politicians are more likely to accommodate pressure for (‘one off’) 
capital projects. Even if a finite initial investment implies future maintenance costs, this commitment 
is not the same as an increase in expenditure on consumption. Government consumption is far more 
difficult to ‘rein in’ if the economy’s upturn is transitory. 
 The implication is that politicians are more likely to increase capital expenditure programmes 
in economic upturns (than current expenditure programmes), and to reduce public expenditures on 
capital programmes in economic downturns (to avoid the loss of popularity that accompanies 
reductions in current expenditures). The fourth prediction is that: 
 
(iv ) Sub-central government capital expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than 
sub-central government current expenditures. 
 
(d) Patterns of procyclicality across state jurisdictions 
 If political pressures are relevant when predicting the likelihood of procyclical government 
expenditure, differences in the way that political pressures are exerted are likely to explain differences 
in procyclical expenditures across sub-central government jurisdictions.  
 Empirical studies indicate that local politicians are likely to be more successful pressing for 
intergovernmental transfers if they are members of the political party incumbent in federal government. 
In the USA, they are more successful if they are members of the same political party as the incumbent 
president (a survey of this literature is presented by Larcinese et al., 2006). Larcinese et al. (2006) 
emphasise the importance of networks in the USA by citing the statement of the Republican former 
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governor Mitt Romney: “For Republican governors, it means we have an ear in the White House, we 
have a number we can call, we have access that we wouldn’t have otherwise had, and that’s of course 
helpful” (Washington Post, November 22, 2004). 
 Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that this ideological relationship proves important in the USA 
because the objective is to use funds to maximize presidential support.10 In this context, it has been 
argued that intergovernmental transfers are more ‘efficient’ when they are targeted on government 
supporters (“….core supporters can be targeted in a more efficient way because parties know their 
preferences better” – Larcinese et al., 2006: 448).  
 If politicians in federal governments are more inclined to offer intergovernmental transfers when 
there is a coincidence between the political-party affiliation of representatives in office at federal and 
at state government, this coincidence is also likely to be relevant when analysing patterns of cyclicality 
across sub-central governments. Grossman (1989) has suggested that the coincidence of representatives 
from the same political party is relevant when explaining the allocation of intergovernmental transfers 
(because local politicians are able to win votes when they increase expenditures without increasing 
taxation) and because local politicians are also able to marshal support for the political party at federal 
government (by crediting federal government for delivery of the intergovernmental transfer). 
 If politicians at federal government are more likely to offer intergovernmental transfers when 
there is a coincidence of the political allegiance of representatives in office at state and at federal 
government, they are even more likely to favour the same sub-central governments in economic upturns. 
The implication is that federal governments will find it more difficult to sustain transfers to these sub-
central governments in economic downturns. The coincidence of political allegiance of representatives 
(in office at state and at federal government) is likely to increase the probability of procyclical sub-
central government expenditure.  
 This analysis of the distribution of fiscal power across fiscal tiers predicts that: 
 
(iv) Sub-central government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical if there is a 
coincidence between representatives of the same political party in office at both state and 
federal government. 
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 Collectively, these predictions paint a distinct pattern of cyclical sub-central government 
expenditure. They describe a pattern of cyclical expenditure within state jurisdictions and across state 
jurisdictions. With heavy reliance on discretionary transfers, is this the pattern of procyclical sub-central 
government expenditures in Mexico? 
 
3. The institutional background 
  As a federal republic, Mexico consists of 31 states plus one Federal District (located in the 
capital city, Mexico City). State government expenditures and revenues in Mexico are described in 
Table 2.  
< TABLE 2 NEAR HERE > 
  
 The states receive intergovernmental transfers from the federal government. On average, these 
transfers constitute 86% of total state revenue, although there is some variation (with a standard 
deviation of 7.02%). Most of the variation in federal transfers is across states (than over time). The 
majority of transfers are non-discretionary (they are provided for specific expenditures, such as 
education, health, crime prevention, etc.). Discretionary transfers are important, at one-third of all sub-
central government revenues. Transfers from the states to the municipalities are an important 
component of expenditure, averaging 45% (with a standard deviation of 13%). Current government 
spending is larger than government investment, with spending on human resources accounting for most 
of government consumption. Included in the ‘Other expenditure’ and ‘Other income’ categories are 
debt interest payments and current borrowing. Since across our sample, debt interest payments are only 
2.63% of total expenditure and current borrowing is only 2.85% of total revenue, we do not consider 
them separate spending and income categories. 
 As transfers are very significant, it is important to consider variability in the distribution of 
transfers across states. Richer states are likely to have a relatively larger proportion of own revenue 
(given their lower level of economic dependency and their greater ability to generate tax revenues from 
greater economic activity). In table 3 summary statistics describe the variability of own revenue across 
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the states. The statistics are consistent with those presented in Table 1. The mean proportion of own 
revenues in total receipts is 6.99%, but the variability is 3.17% (with most of this variability across the 
states, rather than over time). The proportion of own revenue can be as little as 2.23% (in Tabasco) or 
as high as 16.77% (in Chihuahua). Tabasco, in the south of Mexico, is relatively poor, with an economy 
dependent on agriculture. Chihuahua, on the border with the United States of America, has a relatively 
large GDP per capita, relying more heavily on manufacturing. 
 Own revenues include: taxes (road taxes; 2% of payroll taxes; house-selling taxes); rights-
payments (for the use of public goods: licenses, public registration offices, real-state registration acts 
office); payment for services (such as leasing public buildings, the provision of loans and investment, 
the provision of public infrastructure – e.g. tolls for the use of roads); income from fines, donations, 
lotteries. State governments are able to determine tax rates (road tax, payroll tax, etc.). They are able to 
spend these revenues and to redistribute these revenues to state municipalities. Municipalities receive 
tax revenues to provide: street lighting; policing, garbage collection, building approvals, and civil acts 
(such as birth certificates and municipal graveyard services). 
 The federal government collects income and consumption taxes (as well as fees from government 
agencies - e.g. for issuing passports). Both state and federal governments receive income from 
government infrastructure (e.g. road tolls). Non-discretionary federal transfers are provided to finance 
the provision of: medical care; education; welfare services; the infrastructure and financial rescue 
packages. Discretionary federal transfers (that depend, in part, on the availability of federal tax revenue 
– including oil revenue) are approximately 40% of total transfers. Discretionary transfers are used to 
finance: education; welfare services; the provision of law and order. Sub-central government 
expenditures finance the provision of: goods and services; subsidies; welfare payments; charitable 
donations; capital spending and financial investments; security and social development; and public debt 
(capital and interest payments). Debt interest payments are reported as part of ‘other expenditure’ and, 
at 6.42% on average, debt interest payments are a very small part of total expenditure. Borrowing 
(reported in ‘other income’) is a small part of total revenue. 
 To compare state reliance on federal transfers, Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of ‘own 
revenue as a proportion total revenue’, ‘state GDP’ and ‘population’. State GDP and own revenues are 
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positively correlated, implying that richer states have a greater proportion of their total revenues coming 
from state tax revenues. 
< TABLES 3 & 4 NEAR HERE > 
 
 As the intention is to focus on the importance of political networks (when politicians compete 
for discretionary transfers), it is important to consider the way that decisions are made. Mexico has a 
presidential system, consisting of 3 levels of government: the federal union; the state governments (31 
independent states and one federal district); and 2457 municipalities.11 The federal republic has a 
Congress of the Union, consisting of a Senate (upper chamber) and a Chamber of Deputies (lower 
chamber). Each of the states has a republican form of government, consisting of the executive (a 
governor and appointed cabinet), the state legislature (a unicameral congress) and the judiciary. 
 In Mexico, the ‘political sacred cow’ is that politicians cannot stand for re-election. At local 
and national levels, no incumbent can stand as a candidate for re-election to their post. It is the case, 
however, that an incumbent can become a candidate again after spending one term out of office. Local 
politicians have an incentive to win discretionary intergovernmental transfers to win popularity, 
because an increase in popularity is relevant when incumbents consider the electoral payoff to the 
next candidate from their political party that stands for election. It is also the case that local politicians 
have an incentive to win discretionary intergovernmental transfers because the increase in popularity 
will be relevant when: (i) they present themselves for election at a national level, and when (ii) they 
return as a candidate for re-election at a local level (after one term of office). Election to a local 
legislative body is often a platform for election to a national legislative body.12 
 The most important political network to win intergovernmental transfers is the network 
between the state and the lower chamber at federal government. The lower chamber plays an 
important role when assessing the case for discretionary intergovernmental transfers. According to 
article 74 of the Mexican Constitution, the President presents the “Income and Expenses Budget” to 
the lower chamber. Before the budget is approved, the lower chamber (the Cámara de Diputados ) is 
the forum where lobby groups and local politicians press for a larger ‘share of the cake’ (Casar, 1999; 
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OECD, 2009; Lopez-Montiel, 2012). Although the President retains a veto power, it has been rarely 
used (Posner and Park, 2007). 
 
4. The data and the model 
 Data for government spending and revenue in Mexico has been taken from Estadísticas de las 
Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, which is compiled by Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía (INEGI), Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography. GDP figures come from 
INEGI’s Economic Information Database. All data is presented in real pesos of 2003. Data was 
collected for all the Mexican states, except the Distrito Federal, over the period 2003 to 2010 (though 
the estimation period is 2005 to 2010 because first differences and lags are relevant). The Distrito 
Federal was excluded because data is not readily available. Its accounting and budgetary processes 
differ from those of other states.  
 The sample period begins in 2003 because the paper focuses on states’ real GDP (compiled 
using constant 2003 prices) and before 2003 the available data (published from 1993 to 2006) was 
only available in constant 1993 prices. With a change in the base year, there was also a change in the 
methodology that was used to calculate the prices. 
 The cyclicality of government spending and revenues is estimated with the following models 
(e.g. Akitoby, 2006): 
it1it21it11it2it11itit ygyygg       (1) 
it1it21it11it2it11itit yyy       (2) 
where g is the log of real government spending (or its component) for state i at period t; y is the log of 
state real gross domestic product and  is the log of state revenue (or its component) in constant 
prices. The error-correction specification allows the simultaneous estimation of both the short-run 
adjustment process and the long-run relationship. We add 1itg   ( 1it ) to account for potential 
persistence in the growth of government spending (revenues), while ity  and 1ity   are included 
since the cyclical relationship between GDP and government spending (revenues) might not be 
contemporaneous. Policy makers may not have information instantly on the growth of revenues 
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associated with an output shock, so that any spending decisions arising from economic growth may 
evolve over time. The coefficients β1 and β2 estimate the cyclicality of government spending or 
government revenues. For example, β1<0 indicates government spending is counter-cyclical, while 
β1>0 suggests procyclical expenditure. We employ the System Generalized Method of the Moments 
(SYS-GMM) estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) in which lags and lagged differences 
are employed to instrument for endogenous variables. In addition to utilizing the usual SYS-GMM 
instruments to control for the endogeneity of our lagged dependent variable and its lagged level, in 
order to instrument for Mexican states GDP per capita we also add an additional instrument: the 
growth rate of US GDP. Given the proximity of Mexico to the United States of America and the 
strong economic ties, it is reasonable to anticipate that both ity  and 1 ity  will be affected by 
economic growth in the USA. Hence, all right hand side variables are treated as endogenous. In all 
cases, we test our hypotheses from the estimated coefficients and the associated t-ratios, which are 
calculated from robust standard errors. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering in the states. 
Finally, SYS-GMM estimators are said to be consistent if there is no second or fourth order serial 
correlation in the residuals by the SC(2) and SC(4) tests and if the instruments employed are valid 
according to the Sargan test. We report these test results for each of the models estimated in the 
following section. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 This paper focuses on the pattern of cyclical sub-central government expenditures within state 
jurisdictions and across state jurisdictions 
 
(a)  Patterns of cyclical expenditures within state jurisdictions 
 The first question is whether Mexican sub-central government expenditures are procyclical. 
Table 5 reports estimates of the cyclicality of total government spending and its main components. 
SC(1), SC(2) and SC(4) report the Arellano-Bond test for serial correlation in first-differenced errors. 
Since the first difference of white-noise errors will be autocorrelated, rejecting the null hypothesis of 
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no first order serial correlation does not imply model misspecification. Rejecting the null hypothesis at 
higher orders implies the moment conditions are not valid. Using the p-values from the tests, the 
evidence presented in table 5 indicates rejection of the null hypothesis ‘no serial correlation’ at 2nd and 
4th orders in only one case. The results of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions are also shown, 
which are not statistically significant at the 1% in all cases, implying the null hypothesis that the over-
identifying restrictions are valid cannot be rejected. There is evidence to reject the null hypothesis at 
the 5% in three cases. 
 The coefficients show the percentage change in state expenditures for a 1 percentage change in 
GDP. ity  is statistically significant and the estimated coefficient is positively-signed for: total 
government spending; total government consumption and municipal transfers (which is part of 
government consumption).13 When reflecting on prediction (iv), it is impossible to conclude that capital 
spending is more procyclical than current expenditure because capital spending is acyclical. In only one 
case, ‘other expenditure’, is 1ity   statistically significant, but the estimated coefficient is negative. 
Arena and Revilla (2009) reported evidence of procyclical spending for: total expenditure; primary 
spending; capital spending and personnel expenditure (for the 26 states of Brazil and the federal district 
of Brasilia, over the period 1990 to 2006). 
< TABLE 5 NEAR HERE > 
 
 Table 6 describes the cyclicality of various sub-central government income streams. Own 
revenues and discretionary transfers are procyclical, with 1ity   also statistically significant for 
discretionary transfers (implying a lagged response for transfers from a shock to state GDP). Procyclical 
own revenue reflects (in part) the progressive nature of tax revenue. Non-discretionary transfers are 
found to be acyclical. 1ity   is statistically significant for other income. Own revenue is less than 7 per 
cent of total revenue. The important procyclical element in state government revenues is the 
procyclicality of discretionary federal transfers. Discretionary federal transfers constitute almost a third 
of total revenue. As predicted, they are more procyclical than non-discretionary transfers. Evidence of 
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second-order serial correlation is found only for own income and non-discretionary transfers. The 
Hansen test is significant at the 1% for only one case. 
< TABLE 6 NEAR HERE > 
  
 Table 3 described the variation in the percentage of own revenue reported across the states 
(which varies with state GDP). Poorer states rely more heavily on intergovernmental transfers. It has 
been argued that the variation in the extent to which governments rely on transfers is likely to 
influence the procyclicality of government spending. Table 7 reports estimates of the cyclicality of 
total government spending for four regions of Mexico (from Chiquiar (2005)) and presents evidence 
of procyclical spending concentrated among the southern states of Mexico. The southern states are the 
poorest in Mexico, accounting for only 16% of the country’s GDP, according to Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística y Geografía (INEGI).  
< TABLE 7 NEAR HERE > 
 
 The importance of intergovernmental discretionary transfers as a driver of procyclical 
government spending is illustrated in the estimates presented in Table 8. The first difference of 
discretionary federal transfers (trit), in both current and lagged form, and the lagged levels of 
transfers (trit-1) are added to (1), where the dependent variable is the growth in total government 
spending. The results indicate that the impact of discretionary transfers is sufficiently strong to render 
yit statistically insignificant. These results are consistent with the prediction that the expenditures of 
the 31 states in Mexico are more likely to be procyclical because discretionary transfers are 
procyclical.14 
< TABLE 8 NEAR HERE > 
 
(b) Patterns of cyclical sub-central government expenditures across state jurisdictions. 
 Arena and Revilla (2009) found a positive relationship between political coincidence and 
procyclicality, when they considered the coincidence between the presidential party and the state 
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governor (measured in terms of the number of years in which the same political party held both the 
presidency and the gubernational office). When multiple power blocks compete for fiscal revenues, 
political links are likely to intensify voracity effects.  
 Equation (1) can be extended to include ‘coincidence dummies’, PCit and PCit-1, as well as the 
interaction terms  itPCy  and   1itPCy  , where PC equals one when there is political 
coincidence: 
   
it1it31it21it1
1it2it11it2it11it2it11itit
tryg
PCyPCyPCPCyygg




 
 (3) 
In this paper, the intention is to test the proposition that political networks are relevant when 
explaining the variation of cyclicality across sub-central government expenditures. More than one 
political network is likely to be relevant. This paper tests the relevance of political coincidence 
between: (i) the state governor and the federal presidency; (ii) the state legislature and federal 
presidency; (iii) the state governor and the state legislature and (iv) the state governor and the federal 
lower (upper) chamber; and (iv) the state legislature and the federal lower (upper) chamber. 
Coincidence with respect to the federal lower chamber, given its importance in the budget process, is 
expected particularly to exert an influence on the procyclicality of spending. Data on the coincidence 
of power came from the authors’ analysis of local and national elections.15 
Estimates of the revised cyclicality equation for total spending are presented in Table 9. The 
evidence is consistent with the proposition that political networks increase the likelihood of 
procyclical total sub-central government expenditure. The interaction term has a contemporaneous 
effect on itg  when there is political coincidence between the state legislature and the state governor, 
while there is a lagged response when political coincidence exists between: (i) the state governor and 
the federal lower (upper) chamber; (ii) the state legislature and the federal lower (upper) chamber. 
< TABLE 9 NEAR HERE > 
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When the state governorship in a sub-central government jurisdiction and the federal lower 
(upper) chamber are controlled by the same political party there is a greater likelihood that the 
sub-central government will spend procyclically. If politicians in the federal lower chamber are able 
to increase discretionary transfers in economic upturns, they are likely to favour their peer group in 
sub-central governments. In an economic downturn they will then find it even more difficult to sustain 
this increase in discretionary transfers. With the importance of political pressures that can be exerted 
in the federal lower chamber (as described in section three of the paper), the implication is that 
sub-central government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical when the state legislature and 
the federal lower chamber are controlled by the same political party. 
The second observation in Table 9 is that a sub-central government’s expenditure is more likely 
to be procyclical when control of the state legislature and the office of state governor are held by the 
same political party. This result is consistent with the proposition that ‘flypaper effects’ are relevant 
when explaining procyclical sub-central government expenditures.16 Politicians in a state jurisdiction 
spend more of an increase in income received as an intergovernmental transfer than they would if 
their citizens had received an equivalent increase in their income. The more politicians in a political 
party believe that the party is electorally secure, the more confident they feel when spending 
intergovernmental transfers. With a ‘flypaper effect’, state expenditures are more income elastic 
(Bailey and Connolly, 1998). If there is a coincidence between a political party’s control of the state 
legislature and control of the office of state governor, state government expenditures are more income 
elastic. State government expenditures are more procyclical. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
This paper has explored the proposition that the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across fiscal tiers 
in federations increases the likelihood that sub-central government expenditures will be procyclical. 
The paper has focused on the mix of incentives and constraints that influence politicians’ willingness 
to accommodate political pressures to increase public expenditure over the economic cycle.  
Many of the predictions presented and tested are inter-related; collectively they describe a 
distinct pattern of intergovernmental transfers and expenditures. They have been tested with reference 
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to the pattern of public expenditures and intergovernmental transfers in Mexico because the 31 states 
in Mexico are very dependent on intergovernmental transfers as a source of revenue.17 
The first conclusion is that the public expenditures of 31 Mexican states were procyclical 
between 2005 and 2010. If myopic, vote-maximising, politicians are likely to indulge pressures to 
increase expenditure in economic upturns, politicians at sub-central government will also face 
‘flypaper effect’ pressures (if intergovernmental transfers increases in economic upturns). If myopic, 
vote-maximising, politicians face pressures sustaining public expenditure commitments in recessions, 
politicians at sub-central government will face even more intense pressure (because they cannot easily 
rely on borrowing). 
The ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across fiscal tiers also increases the likelihood that 
intergovernmental transfers will be procyclical. While politicians at federal government may choose 
to indulge pressures for intergovernmental transfers in economic upturns, they will not find it as easy 
to indulge these pressures in economic downturns. In economic downturns there is pressure to signal 
to voters that they are increasing their own ‘direct’ expenditures to manage the economy. With more 
room to respond to pressures for discretionary transfers (than to pressures for non-discretionary 
transfers), the second conclusion is that the discretionary transfers received by the 31 state 
governments in Mexico were procyclical and more procyclical than non-discretionary transfers. 
The third conclusion is that sub-central governments in Mexico were more likely to spend 
procyclically the more they relied on discretionary transfers as a revenue source. This conclusion 
emphasises the inter-relationship between the likelihood of procyclical intergovernmental transfers 
and the likelihood of procyclical expenditure.  
The fourth prediction focused on the arguments that (i) producer groups are more effective 
lobbyists (Olson, 1971) and (ii) producer groups are more likely (than consumer-voters) to press for 
capital expenditure (because voters are more aware of current expenditures than capital expenditures – 
Downs, 1960). However there was no evidence that the 31 Mexican states’ capital expenditures were 
systematically more procyclical than other expenditures over the 2005 to 2010 period. One 
implication of this conclusion is that (within federations) political networks between politicians and 
producer groups may be more prevalent at federal government. A further prediction (for further 
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research) is that, in federations, producer groups are more likely to focus on networks with politicians 
at federal government than on networks with politicians at sub-central government.18 
Turning to the final conclusion, political networks are relevant (in federations) when explaining 
the likelihood of procyclical spending across state government jurisdictions. The coincidence of 
political-party control of the office of state legislature and the office of state governor increases the 
likelihood that local politicians will feel that their party is secure enough electorally to accommodate 
pressures exerted by rent-seeking lobby groups.  
It is important to emphasise that, while each of these conclusions is important in its own right, 
collectively they shed insight into a distinct pattern of cyclical transfers and expenditures in 
federations, when local politicians compete for discretionary transfers. Lane (2003) suggested that 
political pressures from state and provincial governments might be relevant when exploring the 
likelihood of procyclical government expenditure in a federation. The over-arching conclusion in this 
paper is that the ‘distribution of fiscal power’ across fiscal tiers exerts a systematic influence on state 
governments’ propensity to spend procyclically. 
 
 
Endnotes 
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Table 1. Growth in discretionary federal transfers and the output gap 
 
Year Percentage 
Output gap 
Percentage growth in 
discretionary transfers 
Percentage growth in 
government consumption 
   
2005 -0.14 8.04 0.04 
2006 2.44 7.91 0.003 
2007 3.20 -2.16 0.03 
2008 1.98 18.06 0.01 
2009 -4.75 -11.19 0.03 
2010 -2.10 8.82 0.02 
   
Correlation with output 
gap 
0.503 -0.434 
  
Source: Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía 
(INEGI) and OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Composition of total spending and income (2005-2010) 
 
   
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
  Overall Between Within   
       
Total Spending (%)       
   
Current expenditure 23.14 13.00 12.70 3.493 4.78 53.41 
Human resources 19.59 12.33 12.08 3.20 3.52 49.88 
Current expenditure 
excluding human 
resources 
3.55 1.46 1.30 0.70 0 7.78 
Capital spending 10.61 5.78 4.63 3.54 1.25 38.89 
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Subsidies, helps and 
transfers 
44.80 12.90 12.18 4.69 12.85 67.95 
Municipal transfers 15.03 2.10 1.86 1.01 7.53 20.25 
Other expenditure 6.42 4.93 3.54 3.47 0.05 23.82 
       
Total Revenue (%) 
 
      
Own income 6.98 3.17 2.93 1.30 2.23 16.77 
Federal transfers 85.89 7.02 5.27 4.73 50.19 96.33 
Discretionary federal 
transfers 
32.92 5.49 4.82 2.77 18.01 51.87 
Non-discretionary 
federal transfers 
52.97 7.93 7.25 3.43 29.03 71.70 
Other income 7.13 6.51 4.07 5.12 0 45.37 
   
Source: Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the percentage of 
states own revenues in total revenues (2005-2010) 
   
 
 Percentage value 
 
 
Mean 
 
6.99 
Standard deviation: 
 
 
overall 3.17 
between 2.93 
Within 
 
1.30 
Minimum 
 
2.23 
Maximum 16.77 
 
Source: Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas Estatales y Municipales, 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 
 
 
 
Table 4: correlation of the proportion of own revenue with state GDP and population (2005-2010) 
 
 Proportion own revenue State GDP State Population 
Proportion own revenue 1   
State GDP 0.229* 1  
State Population 0.085 0.304* 1 
Notes: * indicates significance at the 5% level 
 
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 
 
25
Table 5: Cyclical sensitivity of state spending 
 
Estimated equation: it1it21it11it2it11itit ygyygg    
 
  
 Total spending Capital Spending  Government consumption 
 
    All components Human 
Resources 
Subsidies, assistance 
& transfers 
Municipal 
transfers 
Other 
expenditure 
  
  
git-1 -0.413*** 
(-5.25) 
0.075 
(0.85) 
 -0.233 
(-1.32) 
-0.212 
(-1.18) 
-0.263*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.335*** 
(-3.24) 
0.125 
(0.85) 
yit 0.220** 
(2.02) 
0.328 
(0.68) 
 0.333** 
(2.01) 
0.242 
(0.95) 
0.282 
(1.32) 
0.318* 
(2.15) 
-1.577 
(-0.94) 
yit-1 0.211 
(1.32) 
-0.298 
(-0.39) 
 0.284 
(0.58) 
0.451 
(0.92) 
-0.179 
(-0.49) 
0.207 
(1.16) 
-4.419*** 
(-2.68) 
git-1 -0.009*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.048** 
(-6.71) 
 -0.035*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.042*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.018*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.005 
(-1.61) 
-0.074*** 
(-7.27) 
yit-1 0.0005 
(0.22) 
0.045* 
(2.43) 
 -0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.011 
(-0.54) 
0.008 
(0.75) 
0.013* 
(3.39) 
0.106** 
(2.07) 
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N×T 186 186  186 186 186 186 186 
N 31 31  31 31 31 31 31 
T  6 6  6 6 6 6 6 
No. of instruments 16 16  16 16 16 16 16 
  
SC(1) 0.00 0.00  0.21 0.24 0.05 0.00 0.09 
SC(2) 0.09 0.16  0.94 0.92 0.88 0.41 0.71 
SC(4) 0.13 0.59  0.54 0.42 0.01 0.25 0.67 
  
Hansen test of over 
id. rest 2(10) 
0.02 0.03  0.21 0.19 0.11 0.002 0.21 
  
Wald 2(5) 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
Notes: Estimates of (1) derived using the SYS-GMM dynamic panel data estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998) (t-ratios from robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.). The number of instruments displayed refers to the number of lagged values of the regressors (in level and first difference form) that are used as 
instruments for the explanatory variables. US output growth is included as an additional instrument. SC denotes the tests for serial correlation at 1st, 2nd and 4th order. The autocorrelation tests are for zero autocorrelation in first-
differenced errors. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions is reported, which is robust to heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation. P-values of the diagnostic test are reported. Data sources: Estadísticas de las Finanzas Públicas 
Estatales y Municipales, Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 
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Table 6: Cyclical sensitivity of state revenue 
 
Estimated equation: it1it21it11it2it11itit yyy    
 
   
 Own income Discretionary 
Transfers 
 
Non-discretionary 
Transfers 
 
Other income 
   
it-1 -0.263** 
(-2.48) 
-0.712*** 
(-7.46) 
-0.469*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.073 
(-0.68) 
yit 1.101*** 
(4.04) 
0.380** 
(2.64) 
-0.282 
(-1.35) 
0.984 
(0.65) 
yit-1 0.008 
(0.02) 
0.685*** 
(6.95) 
0.047 
(0.39) 
-3.895** 
(-2.11) 
it-1 -0.032*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.007** 
(-2.45) 
-0.003 
(-1.07) 
-0.074*** 
(-9.88) 
yit-1 0.038*** 
(2.98) 
0.006 
(1.40) 
0.004 
(1.93) 
-0.031 
(-0.46) 
   
N×T 186 186 186 186 
N 31 31 31 31 
T  6 6 6 6 
No. of 
instruments 
16 16 16 16 
   
SC(1) 0.001 0.00 0.01 0.04 
SC(2) 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.95 
SC(4) 0.96 0.85 0.33 0.44 
   
Hansen test of 
over id. rest 
2(10) 
0.09 0.005 0.05 0.19 
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Wald 2(5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
Notes: see table 5 
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Table 7: Cyclicality of total government spending across the regions 
 
Estimated equation: it1it21it11it2it11itit ygyygg    
 
 Mexico Region 
 
   
  Border North Centre South 
   
git-1 -0.413*** 
(-5.25) 
-0.607* 
(-8.18) 
-0.310** 
(-2.76) 
-0.472*** 
(-4.95) 
-0.445*** 
(-3.67) 
yit 0.220** 
(2.02) 
0.072 
(0.31) 
0.102 
(0.48) 
-0.042 
(-0.28) 
0.345** 
(2.87) 
yit-1 0.211 
(1.32) 
 -0.518** 
(-2.38) 
0.160 
(0.54) 
0.190 
(0.67) 
0.182* 
(1.87) 
git-1 -0.009*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.006* 
(-1.86) 
-0.006** 
(-2.27) 
-0.009** 
(-2.30) 
-0.004 
(-1.19) 
yit-1 0.0005 
(0.22) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
0.005** 
(2.00) 
0.004 
(1.10) 
-0.004* 
(-1.69) 
   
N×T 186 36 42 60 42 
N 31 6 7 11 7 
T  6 6 6 6 6 
No. of 
instruments 
16 16 16 16 16 
   
SC(1) 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.05 
SC(2) 0.09 0.83 0.94 0.52 0.05 
SC(4) 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.53 
   
Hansen test of 
over id. rest 
2(10) 
0.02 1.00 0.89 0.61 0.99 
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 
 
30
   
Wald 2(5) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
Notes: see table 5. Classification of Mexican states (from Chiquiar (2005)): Border - states that are contiguous to the US-Mexico border 
(specifically Baja California; Chihuahua; Coahuila de Zaragoza; Nuevo León; Sonora; Tamaulipas); North - states are in between the border and 
centre region (specifically Aguascalientes; Baja California Sur; Durango; Nayarit; San Luis Potosí; Sinaloa; Zacatecas); Centre – the states 
surrounding Mexico City (Colima; Guanajuato; Hidalgo; Jalisco; México; Michoacán de Ocampo; Morelos; Puebla; Querétaro; Tlaxcala; 
Veracruz de Ignacio de la Llave); South –Campeche; Chiapas; Guerrero; Oaxaca; Quintana Roo; Tabasco; Yucatán. 
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Table 8: Extended cyclicality equation for total 
state spending 
 
Estimated equation: 
it1it31it21it1it3
1it2it11itit
trygtr
yygg



  
 Total spending 
 
git-1 -0.224 
(-1.28) 
yit 0.079 
(0.63) 
yit-1 0.047 
(0.31) 
trit 0.513*** 
(6.56) 
trit-1 0.100 
(0.49) 
git-1 -0.032** 
(-2.91) 
yit-1 -0.031** 
(-2.62) 
trit-1 0.038*** 
(3.13) 
 
N×T 186 
N 31 
T  6 
No. of instruments 19 
 
SC(1) 0.02 
SC(2) 0.33 
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SC(4) 0.46 
 
Hansen test of over id. 
rest 2(10) 
0.04 
 
Wald 2(8) 0.00 
Notes: see table 5. 
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Table 9: Sources of procyclical expenditure 
 
Estimated equation:     it1it21it11it2it11it1it11it2it11itit ygyPCyPCPCPCyygg    
 
  
 Coincidence of  
 
 State governor 
and federal 
presidency 
State legislature 
and federal 
presidency 
State governor 
and state 
legislature 
State governor 
and federal 
lower chamber 
State governor 
and federal 
upper chamber 
State legislature 
and federal 
lower chamber 
State legislature 
and federal 
upper chamber 
   
1itg    -0.449*** 
(-5.33) 
-0.419*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.433*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.449*** 
(-5.34) 
-0.442*** 
(-4.88) 
-0.421*** 
(-5.05) 
-0.405*** 
(-4.49) 
ity   0.337*** 
(3.02) 
0.294** 
(2.57) 
-0.501** 
(-2.08) 
0.183 
(1.85) 
0.160 
(1.51) 
0.182 
(1.63) 
0.120 
(1.02) 
1ity   0.229 
(1.50) 
0.232 
(1.39) 
-0.105 
(0.31) 
-0.047 
(-0.28) 
-0.055 
(-0.36) 
0.050 
(0.29) 
-0.011 
(-0.07) 
itPC  -0.001 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-1.03) 
0.001 
(1.54) 
-0.0009 
(-1.57) 
-0.0007 
(-0.85) 
-0.002** 
(-2.66) 
-0.0008 
(-0.85) 
1itPC   0.0009 
(0.40) 
0.002 
(1.82) 
-0.0002 
(-0.15) 
0.0007 
(0.67) 
0.0006 
(0.61) 
0.0002 
(0.25) 
0.0003 
(0.31) 
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 ityPC   -0.592*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.433 
(-1.69) 
0.787*** 
(3.24) 
0.018 
(0.09) 
0.059 
(0.35) 
0.136 
(0.67) 
0.268 
(1.64) 
  1ityPC   0.110 
(0.35) 
0.010 
(0.03) 
0.121 
(0.45) 
0.624*** 
(4.15) 
0.608*** 
(3.39) 
0.512** 
(2.95) 
0.562** 
(2.81) 
1itg   -0.009
*** 
(-3.14) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.23) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.009*** 
(-3.15) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.010*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.011*** 
(-3.22) 
1ity   -0.0003 
(-0.11) 
-0.0001 
(-0.04) 
0.0002 
(0.09) 
0.002 
(0.85) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
0.002 
(1.14) 
0.003 
(1.26) 
   
N×T 186 186 186 186 186 186 186 
N 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
T  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
No. of instruments 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
   
SC(1) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SC(2) 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.18 
SC(4) 0.16 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.06 
   
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
 
 
35
Joint significance: ity  
and  ityPC   
0.004 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.05 
Joint significance: 1ity   
and   1ityPC   
0.32 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
   
Hansen: test of over id. 
rest 2(10) 
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Wald 2(9) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   
Notes: see table 5 
 
1 Henisz’s index is based on the number of veto points in the process of decision-making and on the distribution of differences in preferences for government 
spending. The first step in compiling the index is to count the number of veto points over policies in branches of government. Voracity effects are likely to be 
less relevant as this number increases. The index also considers differences in group preferences but voracity effects are likely to more relevant as these 
increase. 
2 Sub-central governments are free to spend discretionary transfers as they wish. In some cases the intention is to rely on pre-defined formulae to allocate 
discretionary transfers, but in practice the allocation of discretionary transfers depends on pressure exerted at the lower chamber of federal government (from 
the Cámara de Diputados ).  
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3 In 2005, intergovernmental transfers were 23% of total government expenditure in Mexico while, on average, they were only 13% of total government 
expenditure in the OECD (Blöchliger and Vammalle, 2009). 
4 Local politicians must respond to political pressures for increase spending from: local bureaucrats (Niskanen, 1971; Romer and Rosenthal, 1980); local 
interest groups (Dougan and Kenyon, 1988); and local voters (Oates, 1979). 
5 While this outcome is to be expected when intergovernmental transfers take the form of matching grants, it is a surprise when intergovernmental transfers 
take the form of lump sum, unconditional grants. 
6 Some critics argue that they do not observe flypaper effects and others argue that if there is a ‘flypaper effect’, it is not obvious that this is caused by failings 
in political processes. Cullis and Jones (2009) review this literature. Here the argument is simply that, in the presence of a (well-documented) flypaper effect, 
the flypaper effect increases the tendency for procyclical sub-central government expenditures. 
7 While fiscal responsibilities for the provision of local public goods are devolved to sub-central government, central governments retain responsibility for 
macroeconomic stabilization (because central government actions are more productive). Sub-central government spending is less effective. If sub-central 
governments were to rely on deficit spending they would be forced to compete with one another (for example by paying higher interest rates to attract 
loanable funds). If one local jurisdiction attempted to reduce local unemployment it would have very little success because (with open trade between 
jurisdictions) the multiplier is very low. 
8 They must reduce spending if intergovernmental transfers do not increase in a recession. 
9 It is important to note that producers are also likely to press governments to increase current expenditure and to increase capital expenditure (because an 
increase in current government expenditure is likely to increase demand for their services). The argument is about the extent to which producers and 
consumers are likely to press for increases in capital expenditures. Producers are more likely to press for increases in capital expenditures than voters. 
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10 Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Crouch and Shughart (1998) focused on the New Deal to report a positive correlation between Roosevelt’s share of votes 
in US states and spending at the state level. 
11 The number of municipalities varies in size across the states, from a minimum of 5 (for the state of Baja California) to 571 (Oaxaca). 
12 Based on the biographies provided on the Cámara de Diputados website (www.diputados.gob.mx) about each legislature member, we find that 39% of the 
deputies (194 out of 500) were at some point members of their respective local state legislature, 72% of them within the last 6 years. Additionally, 34 of the 
500 were Senators. While 84 have been members of the lower chamber at least twice. 
13 Further analysis (not reported) suggested evidence of procyclicality for both upturns and downturns. 
14 A flypaper effect will increase the impact that procyclical transfers exert on the procyclicality of state government expenditures. The impact will also 
depend on the importance of this revenue source. In Mexico, discretionary federal transfers are a third of all revenue sources and not all revenue sources are 
procyclical. The results in table 8 are consistent with the prediction that procyclical discretionary federal transfer will exert a greater influence on the 
cyclicality of state government expenditures the more that state governments rely on discretionary federal transfers as a source of revenue. 
15 Electoral results at local—state—level can be accessed on each state’s Electoral Institute (Instituto Estatal Electoral) which is the institutional body in 
charge of organizing all local elections. At national level, the Instituto Federal Electoral (www.ife.gob.mx) is the one responsible for organizing, regulating 
and counting the elections for President and both Legislative chambers. All data can be accessed from: http://www.eleccionesenmexico.org.mx 
16 Further analysis, available from the authors upon request, suggests discretionary federal transfers are procyclical with respect to the output gap of national 
GDP. 
17 The advantage of focussing on a case study is that it is possible to highlight the areas that are to be explored but, of course, we freely acknowledge that this 
is just one case study.  
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18 The Economist (24 November, 2012) suggests that, as politicians in Mexico are unable to retain office in a consecutive year, they are concerned about their 
future employment opportunities when they receive representations from business lobby groups. 
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